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tions. If the Supreme Court in the principal case has abandoned its use of the canon of construction under discussion,
the result should be an aid toward determination of true
legislative purpose.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES
RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR TO APPEAL
The administrator of an estate applied to the court for
leave to sell realty to pay debts. A bid of $3500 was received
for a tract of 40 acres which the court subsequently approved. Before the sale had been completed, a second bid
of $3500 was received for 20 of the 40 acres, i.e., an equal
amount was offered for one-half the land. The administrator
therefore filed a petition in court asking that the uncompleted
sale to the first bidder be set aside. The court refused to set
aside the sale and ordered that the deed be delivered to the
first bidder. On appeal by the administrator, the Appellate
Court affirmed the judgment on the ground that the administrator had no appealable interest. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that the administrator had a
duty to sell real estate for the best obtainable price, and to
that extent at least he was "trustees for the heirs" and as such
was authorized to appeal from the order directing him to sell
at the low price. Ohifest v. Rosenberg, 75 N.E. 2d 147 (Ind.
1947).
The problem before the court in the instant case was
to determine whether the judgment ordering the completion
of the sale to the lower bidder affected the interest of the
estate which the administrator represented in such a way
that he should be allowed to appeal from it. Since there was
no controlling authority on this point,' the problem had to be
resolved in the light of the more general rights of an administrator to appeal in his representative capacity.
The rights of a representative to appeal in his represent1.

In Simpson v. Pearson, 81 Ind. 1 (1869) and Staley v. Dorset, 11
Ind 367 (1858), appeals by administrators were dismissed on other
grounds, implying that orders for the sale of real estate could be
appealed by administrators. However in Hetzell v. Morrision, 115

Ind. App. 512 60 N.E.2d 150 (1945), it was held that the admin-

istratrix could not appeal the denial of such an order, but there
were other facts to justify the dismissal of this appeal. Thus

there was no explicit authority on the proposition.
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ative capacity are and should be determined by the nature
and limits of his position and his relationship to those represented. The cost of such appeals is paid out of the funds of
the estate, trust, or receivership, as the case may be. Consequently, an appeal will not be allowed unless the representative alleges such an injury to the interest which he represents
that if relief be granted on appeal the benefits will accrue to
that interest. In the field of administration of estates courts
have adhered to this rule closely. Thus an administrator
cannot appeal from judgments which injure him personally 2
or which operate against a stranger and not against the
estate.3 Likewise a judgment construing a will cannot be appealed by an administrator,4 because such a judgment injures
only individual legatees and not the estate, the unit which
the administrator represents. On the other hand, the administrator's right to appeal from a judgment allowing claims
against the estate is universally recognized. And although
other states have held to the contrary," Indiana courts allow
the administrator to appeal from a final order of distribution.7
That a court's conception of the nature of the representative capacity determines the right or absence of right of the
representative to appeal is amply demonstrated by the conflicting opinions rendered in the instant case by the Appellate
and Supreme Courts. The Appellate Court stated that real
estate descends directly to heirs or devisees subject only to
the right of the administrator to sell if necessary to pay
debts. Therefore, it said, the administrator was not harmed
by the order to sell 40 acres instead of 20 acres for $3500.
Several inferences may thus be drawn as to the Appellate
2. Ansel v. Kyger, 60 Ind. App.259, 110 N.E. 559 (1915).
3. MeCollister v. Greene County National Bank, 171 Ill. 608, 49 N.E.
734 (1898).
4. Stoner v. Gloystein, 193 Ind. 614, 140 N.E. 435 (1923); Case v.
Deal, 177 Ind. 288, 98 N.E. 56 (1912).
5. Gillette's Appeal, 82 Conn. 500, 74 Atl. 762 (1909); Harper v.
Stroud, 41 Tex. 367 (1874); See Note, 118 A.L.R. 743 (1938). Indiana provides by statute that administrators and executors may
appeal without bond.

§2-3217.

6.

hnd. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-2003 and

McDonald v. McDonald, 291 Mass. 299, 197 N.E. 3 (1935); Bryant
v. Thompson, 128 N.Y. 426, 28 N.E. 522 (1891); First National

Bank v. Rawson, 54 Ohio App. 285, 7 N.E.2d 6 (1936); See Note,

117 A.L.R. 99 (1938).

7. Ruch, Adm. v. Biery, 110 Ind. 444, 11 N.E. 312 (1886); followed
in Keener v. Grubb, 44 Ind. 564, 89 N.E. 896 (1909).
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Court's conception of the nature of an administrator. Implicit in the emphasis on the fact that the administrator had
no title to the land is a decision that the nature -of the administrator's duty differs, depending upon whether the subject matter of the duty is real or personal property. The
implication is that in the sale of land the administrator owes
no duty to the heirs to obtain the best price or to preserve
for them as much land as possible. The Appellate Court also
stressed the fact that there was other land available to the
administrator sufficient to pay all creditors. It implied that
it would have allowed the appeal had the trial court's order
to sell affected adversely the interests of creditors. The Appellate Court's opinion was thus obviously framed on the
premise that an administrator has a greater duty to creditors
than he has to heirs.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in its basic assumption that an administrator owes a fidicuiary duty to the
heirs and devisees reveals a different conception of his function. Under this assumption the conclusion that he may
appeal an order adverse to their interests, as in the instant
case, is unavoidable.
Although conceptions of the nature of the representative
capacity of administrators and executors are demonstrably
of vital significance, it is virtually impossible to find an
analytical description of the nature of this representative
capacity. Such expositions as may be found are given in
terms of the law of trusts, the courts saying that administrators are trustees for the creditors and heirs. 8 The unreality
of such language is apparent when it is realized that creditors
and heirs are inevitably adverse parties.9 The words "trust,"
"trustee," and "fiduciary duty" are merely convenient but
inaccurate descriptions of a result, concealing rather than
clarifying the fundamental considerations which should guide
the courts in analysis. As regards creditors, it is clear that
the administrator is not a trustee as that word is used in
8. Stone et al. v. Elliott, 182 Ind. 454, 106 N.E. 710 (1914), and
cases there cited.
9. It is true that when one person is to take the earnings of a trust

and another the principal after a period of time, there may ba
some question as to whether particular assets are earnings or
part of the principal. To the extent that this occurs, the trustee

serves persons with interests somewhat adverse. In that situation, however, the task is classification of assets. There are no
conflicting interests in trust property once it has been classified.
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trust law to indicate a fiduciary acting on behalf of others.
At many stages in the administration he acts adversely to
the interests of creditors. He disputes any claim'0 which he
deems to be without merit." If by chance a creditor fails
to appear in court his claim will be dismissed.12 At every
point in the proceedings the creditor is required to protect
his own interest. It can hardly be said that the administrator is acting as the creditor's trustee.
If analogy is desirable, perhaps a closer analogy for the
administrator-creditor relationship is that of receivers or
trustees in bankruptcy toward creditors. There is a distinct
parallel between receivers and administrators of insolvent
estates. Insolvency has dispelled the expectancy of heirs and
beneficaries. The duty of the administrator is thus, like
that of the receiver, merely to pay debts in the order and proportion set out by the court to the extent of the available
assets. But since the law does not operate on the assumption
that all estates are insolvent, this analogy too breaks down
when the facts change.
Probably the best way to determine the true nature of
the administrator's capacity is to look to the purpose underlying the legal institution of administration of decedent's
estates. This purpose may be said to be to establish one person
who will have the responsibility of settling the deceased's
business affairs and distributing his property as his will or
as the law of descent and distribution prescribes. As a practical matter there must be some one person to whom all interested parties may look. Any other course would lead to
complete confusion with no creditor knowing with whom to
file a claim, no debtor knowing to whom to pay his debt, and
no heir or devisee knowing to whom to look for payment. It
is apparent, therefore, that the administrator needs broad
authority to accomplish his task.
The law seems to recognize that the principal duty of
the administrator is toward the devisees and heirs. If there
is no will, the statute provides that the nearest heir may become the administrator. 1 3 Only if all the heirs decline will
10. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-1001. All claims against the
estate must be filed in the office of the clerk of court.
11. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-1013. The administrator is required to set up all available defences to any claim filed.
12. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-1014.
13. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-301 provides that letters of
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a creditor be selected as an administrator. Thus personal
interest is utilized to assure that the interest of devisees and
heirs is protected. In addition, the extensive accounting and
supervision required by law, 14 while sometimes protecting
creditors if the estate is insolvent or near insolvency, protects the interest of heirs and devisees in the ordinary circumstance, viz., the case of a solvent estate. In the same way,
the duty of the administrator to contest claims of creditors
will ordinarily operate to the benefit of heirs and devisees.
Thus far, it might perhaps be defensible to say that
the administrator is "trustee" for the heirs in that he acts for
their interests. But when he finds it necessary to deal with
realty, to which he does not have title, the strict analogy to
trust law fails. It ip at this point that the use of the analogy
creates real and vital confusion. It is obvious error to reason
that because the administrator has no title and is not a trustee he therefore does not act for the heirs. There is no reason
why the administrator should not owe the same duty to the
heirs when selling real estate as he owes when dealing with
personal property. The duty with respect to the personal
property arises not out of the title which he holds but out of
the situation. This same situation obtains when real estate
is being sold to pay debts. The fact that the title to land alone
passes directly to heirs is merely a historical accident. Practical considerations should determine whether the administrator acts for the heirs. As a practical matter, although the
heirs are made parties to any petition to sell land, the administrator is expected to look after their interest.'
He is the
one who has handled the affairs and the one to whom the

14.

15.

administration shall be granted first to the widow or widower,
second to the next of kin, and then to the largest creditor applying and residing in the state.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §6-501 requires every executor or
administrator to file a bond of at least double the amount of the
personal estate to be administered. §6-1401 requires that the administrator keep a complete record of all assets of the estate received and disbursed. It is the .duty of the court at the beginning
of each term to call the estates pending before the court for reports
due from the executors and administrators as provided in §6-1413.
Any executor or administrator failing to file the account as required shall be proceeded against as for contempt by §6-1414.
Bell v. Shaffer, 154 Ind. 413, 56 N.E. 217 (1900).
The courts
in some states have construed statutes to require that the administrator take possession of the realty pending administration even
though the title is in the heirs and devisees. Meeks v. Hahn, 20
Cal. 620 (1862); Bishop v. Locke, 92 Wash. 90, 158 Pac. 997
(1916); Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 997, 30 Pac. 648 (1892).
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claims have been made. Although the heirs have title, this
has no bearing on whether they are well enough informed
about the affairs of the estate to know that there is occasion
to contest a petition for the sale of land or to appeal an order
for such a sale.
A clear understanding of the function performed by
the administrator leads to the conclusion that his duty to
the heirs is not limited to those subjects to which he has
title. The Supreme Court, by recognizing this, has provided
the basis for overruling some decisions of the Appellate Court
which have emphasized title to the exclusion of the more
realistic considerations which should be the basis for de16
cision.
EVIDENCE
INSPECTION OF OPPONENT'S CHATTELS
BEFORE TRIAL
An action was brought for damages against a soft-drink
bottling company on account of illness allegedly resulting
from the presence of poisonous foreign matter in the bottle
from which the plaintiff drank. Prior to the trial plaintiff
refused defendant permission to have a chemical analysis
made of the contents of the bottle and the court denied
defendant's motion to require plaintiff to deposit the
bottle with the court so that an analysis could be made.
During the trial plaintiff's attorney stated that he had never
had a chemical analysis made but objected to testifying that
he had refused to permit the defendant to make such an
analysis. Objection sustained, verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court of South Carolina
upheld the order denying defendant's motion but reversed
the judgment and ordered a new trial. The evidence excluded
was a circumstance which the jury should have been permitted
to consider. Welsh v. Gibbons, 46 S.E. 2d 147 (S.C. 1948).
That litigants in a modern trial, where the main issue
is whether or not deleterious substances were present in consumer's goods, can carry the case to judgment without sub16.

Richcreek v. Richereek, 116 Ind. App. 422, 64 N.E.2d 308 (1945).
See also Hetzell v. Morrison, 115 Ind. App. 512, 60 N.E.2d 150
(1945), where although the correct result was undoubtedly reached
in view of the other facts of the case, the Appellate Court argued
in terms of title.

